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Abstract
Corroborating upper echelons theory, this study picks up the notion that narcissistic chief executive officers (CEOs) take 
advantage of accounting choices to enhance their firms’—and inherently their own—personal track records. Using a set of 15 
indicators, reflecting the narcissistic trait of 1126 CEOs for the period 1992 to 2012, we find evidence of highly narcissistic 
CEOs engaging in accrual-based earnings management (ABEM). In contrast to prior research, the results show evidence 
not only for income-increasing but also for income-decreasing ABEM. This indicates that highly narcissistic CEOs not 
only strive to influence stakeholders’ perception of current performance. We conclude that they also assess their potential 
to influence perception of current and future earnings. The results imply that highly narcissistic CEOs’ accounting choices 
are driven by self-serving behavior rather than by the intention to provide additional information to the market. When earn-
ings management techniques are used to derive personal advantage from the presentation of a firm’s earnings, the literature 
refers to this as a case of low earnings quality reflecting unethical behavior. Accordingly, this study contributes to the field 
of business ethics by showing that CEO narcissism is related to low earnings quality in that it is associated to discretionarily 
decreasing accruals.
Keywords CEO narcissism · Earnings management · Upper echelons theory · Personality · Corporate governance
JEL Classification G34 · M12 · M41 · M51
Introduction
Earnings management refers to management’s discretion 
to exercise judgement about a firm’s financial performance 
(Schipper and Vincent 2003). On the one hand, manage-
ment can use its superior information to better inform stake-
holders about the firm’s future earnings prospects (Healy 
and Wahlen 1999). They do so to enhance a firm’s earn-
ings quality, and more generally financial reporting quality, 
and by extension to increase firm value (Gaio and Raposo 
2011). On the other hand, prior literature considers behavior 
to be unethical if management uses its discretion to derive 
personal advantages, such as securing their compensation, 
status, or job (McManus 2016; Harris and Bromiley 2007). 
Such earnings management practices can be quite harmful 
(Kaplan 2001). The National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting (1987, pp. 5, 6) concludes that earn-
ings management practices can mislead financial statement 
users and sometimes are precursors to more serious illegal 
and fraudulent reporting activities. Accordingly, earnings 
management practices probably raise the greatest ethical 
issues facing the accounting profession (Merchant and Rock-
ness 1994). In addition, recent findings suggest an associa-
tion between personality traits and ethical misconduct (van 
Scotter and Roglio 2018). Therefore, this study attempts to 
provide further insights into the relationship between CEO 
narcissism as a personality trait and earnings management.
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Upper echelons theory posits that organizational out-
comes such as earnings quality are a reflection of chief 
executive officers’ (CEO) decision-making and consequently 
originate in CEOs’ characteristics (Hambrick and Mason 
1984). Specifically, CEOs’ observable characteristics such 
as tenure, age, or gender as well as psychological character-
istics such as values or personality influence their decision-
making (Bromiley and Rau 2016; Carpenter et al. 2004). 
More specifically, Amernic and Craig (2010) theoretically 
propose that CEO narcissism as a personality trait is related 
to a company’s earnings quality. Accordingly, extremely nar-
cissistic CEOs tend to make equivocal accounting choices to 
present their company’s financial status in the best possible 
light. By inflating perceived company performance, they 
seek to achieve self-enhancement through self-affirmation 
and/or admiration from third parties (Campbell et al. 2000; 
Horvath and Morf 2010). In the case of CEO narcissism, it 
is further argued that striving for self-enhancement can harm 
a company’s financial outcomes or reputation (Lubit 2002).
In response to this issue, this study analyzes the influ-
ence of personality on decisions involving earnings quality 
by exploring whether CEOs manage earnings contingent on 
their narcissism. Prior literature finds empirical evidence 
that greater CEO narcissism coincides with a higher like-
lihood of committing fraud (Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 
2013) or releasing financial misstatements (Schrand and 
Zechman 2012; McManus 2016). More closely related to 
this study, a positive relationship has been found between 
CEO narcissism and earnings management (Olsen et al. 
2014; Capalbo et al. 2017). However, while prior literature 
indicates that earnings are inflated, it has not examined 
whether narcissistic CEOs also decrease earnings to possi-
bly prepare the ground for inflating future earnings. It is well 
known in accounting literature that accruals are a function 
of the difference between reported earnings and real cash 
flows and that both items have to converge over time (Baber 
et al. 2011; DeFond and Park 2001; Chan et al. 2004). In this 
regard, income-decreasing accrual-based earnings manage-
ment (ABEM) is an opportunity to retain earnings for future 
benefits, for example (Jones 1991). Accordingly, this study 
examines whether narcissistic CEOs are associated with 
low earnings quality by discretionarily decreasing accruals 
besides overstating earnings whenever possible.
We build on a model that uses a set of 15 indicators to 
measure CEO narcissism—namely publicity, number of 
awards, number of lines in the CEO’s personal profile, per-
sonal use of the firm’s corporate jet, cash compensation, 
total compensation, ratios of cash and total compensation 
compared to that of the second-best paid executive, com-
pensation rank, CEO duality, number of role titles, govern-
ance measurement, appearance in annual reports, value, 
and number of acquisitions. Consistent with upper echelons 
theory, using a sample of 671 S&P 500 companies with 1126 
CEOs over the period 1992 to 2012, we provide empirical 
evidence that ABEM is associated with CEOs’ narcissistic 
trait. The findings suggest that highly narcissistic CEOs do 
not solely strive to optimize their firm’s short-term financial 
performance, as indicated by a prior finding of a positive 
association between CEO narcissism and ABEM (Capalbo 
et al. 2017). Interestingly, income-decreasing activities are 
also associated with highly narcissistic CEOs in that they 
give them the opportunity of subsequent reversal of accruals. 
We refer to this action as an opportunistic bias with regard 
to ABEM, reflecting narcissistic CEOs’ tendency to not only 
be influenced by their narcissistic myopia but also to assess 
their potential to influence earnings in the current as well as 
in future periods. We see that these higher levels of discre-
tionary accruals—in both directions—result from a desire 
to present a firm’s—and inherently the CEO’s own—track 
record in a better light rather than to better inform stake-
holders about a firm’s future financial performance. This 
finding contributes new aspects to the field of business ethics 
because earnings management—regardless of its direction—
is seen as a violation of ethical practices when it serves man-
agement’s incentives (Merchant and Rockness 1994).
This study also extends the line of research that examines 
top management personalities to identify aspects relating to 
corporate governance (CG) mechanisms (Libby et al. 2015). 
As it is challenging to measure an individual’s personality in 
a large-scale survey, most earnings management research has 
so far concentrated on CG mechanisms that mitigate man-
agers’ self-serving behavior, with little emphasis on indi-
viduals’ traits (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta 2009). 
However, mechanisms to mitigate managers’ self-serving 
behavior—such as a code of conduct, organizational rules, 
or the monitoring of actions—have little to no impact on 
unethical behavior when taking organizational narcissism 
into account (Duchon and Drake 2009; Collier and Rob-
erts 2001). Accordingly, these mechanisms are not effective 
in helping companies avoid the potential harm caused by 
CEO narcissism. Therefore, this study helps to better under-
stand the influence of individuals’ traits on underlying CG 
mechanisms.
Literature Review and Framework
Narcissism
Narcissism refers to “a pervasive pattern of grandiosity 
(in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of 
empathy” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 
669). Whereas clinical research refers to narcissism as a 
stable mental disorder involving excessive and dysfunc-
tional self-love, in subclinical terms it is measured as a 
personality dimension with a set of character traits such as 
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self-confidence, egotism, or dominance (Raskin and Hall 
1979). The original Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) 
psychometric scale proposed by Raskin and Hall (1979) 
was validated and the number of measurement items fur-
ther reduced in subsequent studies (Emmons 1984; Raskin 
and Hall 1981). Finally, leadership/authority, superiority/
arrogance, self-absorption/self-admiration, and exploitative-
ness/entitlement were identified as the four principal com-
ponents of narcissism (Emmons 1987). In the following we 
look at narcissism as a personality trait rather than a disorder 
because our measure of narcissism is based on archival data 
which, in contrast to personal interviews, makes it difficult 
or even impossible to assess an underlying disorder.
We then shed further light on this distinction by review-
ing the literature on the relationship between narcissism and 
its subcomponents in more detail. Firstly, there is a consen-
sus in prior research that there is a particularly strong asso-
ciation between the component of authority and dominance 
(Bradlee and Emmons 1992; Raskin and Terry 1988) which 
positively moderates the relationship between narcissism 
and self-esteem (Brown and Zeigler-Hill 2004). Accord-
ingly, narcissists have a strong bias towards positive appear-
ance, which feeds their desire to be the center of attention 
and helps them to emerge as leaders (Vazire et al. 2008; 
Hogan and Kaiser 2005; Brunell et al. 2008). Secondly, nar-
cissistic individuals tend to predict positive illusions about 
themselves, which causes them to consider their abilities and 
themselves superior (Hickman et al. 1996; Robins and Beer 
2001; Gabriel et al. 1994). Thus, narcissists make initial pos-
itive impressions, but—over time—are negatively perceived 
within groups due to their arrogance (Paulhus 1998; Hogan 
and Hogan 2001). Thirdly, the component of self-admiration 
helps narcissists to maintain a strong belief system and to 
develop charisma and grand visions, which are seen as prem-
ises for effective leadership (Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006). 
However, narcissistic individuals exhibit pervasive patterns 
of grandiosity and self-importance which causes them to 
constantly crave attention that reaffirms their positive self-
view and admiration by others (DeWall et al. 2011; Morf 
and Rhodewalt 2001; Horvath and Morf 2010). As a conse-
quence, narcissistic leaders spend a considerable amount of 
time engaging in self-aggrandizement rather than promoting 
firm outcomes (Bass and Steidlmeier 1999). Fourthly, the 
component of entitlement depicts a pattern of selfish and 
self-serving beliefs and behavior to accentuate one’s self-
importance, such as insisting on a higher salary than that 
earned by their fellow employees (Campbell et al. 2004a). 
In combination with lack of empathy, narcissists exploit oth-
ers to increase their self-worth (Morf and Rhodewalt 2001).
In sum, narcissism positively correlates with determinants 
of effective leadership such as high self-esteem but also with 
a constant need for admiration from others, which reveals 
a contradiction—namely the narcissistic paradox (Emmons 
1984). Unraveling the complex nature of narcissism, Kets de 
Vries and Miller (1985) differentiate in its extremes between 
reactive and constructive leadership types. In the former 
case, narcissists only exhibit fragile self-esteem and core 
self-evaluation because they feel a constant need for affirma-
tion of their self-view (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; Sput-
tek 2012). Thus, narcissistic leaders apply self-enhancement 
strategies in pursuit of continuous self-affirmation (Horvath 
and Morf 2010; Morf and Rhodewalt 2001; Paulhus and 
Williams 2002), moderated by perceived self-enhancement 
opportunity (Wallace and Baumeister 2002; Campbell et al. 
2000). Most relevant to the present study are defensive 
self-enhancement strategies to protect CEOs from failure 
or shame, such as in the case of poor accounting numbers 
(Raskin et al. 1991; Morf and Rhodewalt 1993). Taking the 
reactive and constructive side of narcissism into account, 
we see narcissism as a trait that is associated with individu-
als’—in our case CEOs’—behavior and consequently their 
accounting choices in an equivocal way.
Earnings Management and Unethical Behavior
Companies have always engaged extensively in earnings 
management practices (for an overview see Healy and 
Wahlen 1999), yet they are not representative of unethical 
behavior per se. Managers can make financial statements 
more informative and inherently signal their superior knowl-
edge to the market (Healy and Wahlen 1999). However, 
earnings management practices may also turn into earn-
ings manipulation if management decides to make use of 
its discretion to take personal advantage. These advantages 
vary broadly, e.g., creating the impression of complying 
with legal requirements, guaranteeing executive compensa-
tion, meeting analyst’s forecasts, issuing equity offerings, 
acquiring firms, influencing import relief investigations, and 
many more (McManus 2016; Harris and Bromiley 2007; 
Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; 
Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Erickson and Wang 1999; Jones 
1991). Such manipulative earnings management practices 
are believed to be unethical (Hong and Andersen 2011) as 
they reduce transparency and leads to misleading financial 
information that may in the end be harmful for the firms, 
their investors, and other stakeholders (Kim et al. 2012; 
Grasso et al. 2009). Accordingly, earnings management 
practices raise questions about managements’ ethics (Bruns 
and Merchant 1990), which may negatively impact managers 
and firms (Kaplan 2001) as well as other financial statement 
users (Merchant and Rockness 1994). In addition, earnings 
management is not necessarily unlawful but many research-
ers questioned the ethics of such practices.
Applying an ethics perspective, Merchant and Rockness 
(1994, p. 82) ask “How does a society, the accounting profes-
sion, or an individual firm draw the line between acceptable 
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and unacceptable earnings management practices?”. From 
an ethical perspective the question is whether engaging in 
earnings management is the right thing to do (Kaplan 2001). 
This is not always an easy question to answer, because many 
types of earnings management behavior are not obviously 
acceptable or unacceptable. Merchant and Rockness (1994) 
provide initial evidence on how individuals judge earnings 
management practices from an ethical perspective. In their 
study, they examined the ethical judgements of various 
organizational members (e.g., general managers, corporate 
staff, and internal auditors). Some of the findings show areas 
of general agreement with regard to some characteristics. 
For example, the individuals surveyed have a higher tol-
erance for operating expense manipulation than financial 
accounting manipulation (Merchant and Rockness 1994, 
p. 89). In another study, Fischer and Rosenzweig (1995) 
compare the ethical judgments of accounting students and 
accounting professionals. They confirm the aforementioned 
findings and try to interpret the findings by differentiating 
between a rule-based view of ethics and a view based on the 
ethical assessments of the decision’s effects on stakeholder 
groups (Fischer and Rosenzweig, 1995, p. 439).
In line with Thompson and Loewenstein (1992), the 
above-mentioned studies show that there are differences in 
the interpretation of ethical judgment on earnings manage-
ment practices depending on the different roles of the indi-
viduals. By fulfilling different roles, individuals are affected 
in different ways and therefore their ethical assessment is 
also expected to differ. In this study, we look at the role of 
CEOs’ personal traits when it comes to engaging in earnings 
management.1
We measure ABEM by discretionary accruals, namely the 
accruals that are determined by management’s discretion and 
specifically by management’s accounting choices. Accord-
ingly, RAM represents the cash flows, production levels, or 
discretionary expenses that are determined by management’s 
discretion, such as granting discounts or decreasing advertis-
ing expenses in order to polish company profits.
Framework
As argued by upper echelons theory, managers’ experiences, 
values, and personalities strongly influence their decision-
making and consequently firm outcomes (Hambrick and 
Mason 1984; Carpenter et al. 2004; Hambrick 2007; Wang 
et al. 2016). Upper echelons theory is hence linked to CEO 
narcissism, explaining firm performance, entrepreneurial 
orientation, and various management choices such as acqui-
sitions, technological discontinuities, internationalization 
decisions, as well as levels and profiles of corporate social 
responsibility (Patel and Cooper 2014; Gerstner et al. 2013; 
Aktas et al. 2016; Engelen et al. 2016; Petrenko et al. 2016; 
Oesterle et al. 2016; Zhu and Chen 2015a).
To analyze whether managerial characteristics have an 
impact on accounting choices, prior literature has linked 
manager-specific effects to earnings quality without con-
sidering a specific trait (Bamber et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that earnings management 
is affected by CEOs’ decisions which depend, for example, 
on their reputation, the tone at the top, or equity incentives 
(Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006; Francis et al. 2008; Patelli and Pedrini 2015; Plöck-
inger et al. 2016). In addition, Ali and Zhang (2015) find 
that CEO tenure is associated with earnings management, 
a link which is, however, less present in firms with greater 
external and internal monitoring. There is further evidence 
that an effective CG policy reduces management’s discretion 
to manage earnings (Cornett et al. 2008; Armstrong et al. 
2010). However, managerial characteristics have also been 
found to have an impact on the setting of a firm’s manage-
ment accounting and control systems (Hiebl 2014; Morelli 
and Lecci 2014; Naranjo-Gil et al. 2009; Abernethy et al. 
2010; Harlez and Malagueño 2016; Su et al. 2015). More 
specifically, CEOs have been found to have the power to 
force CFOs and accountants to inflate reported earnings to 
meet or exceed targets (Davis et al. 2006; Feng et al. 2011; 
Graham et al. 2013). Given that managerial characteristics 
can have an impact on accounting choices, this study exam-
ines whether narcissistic CEOs are associated with low earn-
ings quality.
Hypothesis Development
Taking a narcissist’s striving for power and self-importance 
into account, we expect the relationship between CEO nar-
cissism and its inherent discretion to manage earnings to 
be more pronounced for narcissistic CEOs than for their 
non-narcissistic peers. As such, narcissistic CEOs tend to 
weaken a firm’s CG in order to corroborate their power 
(Grant and McGhee 2013). In addition, narcissistic CEOs 
tend to grant themselves higher compensation packages than 
fellow employees to reassure their self-importance (Hayward 
and Hambrick 1997). Furthermore, narcissistic CEOs lean 
towards selecting directors who have a similarly strong nar-
cissistic trait. This supports the notion that CEO narcissism 
potentially weakens control by the board (Zhu and Chen 
2015b). In a nutshell, the literature theoretically proposes 
that narcissistic CEOs identify with the company they lead, 
and use accounting measures to gain the admiration of their 
share- and other stakeholders, which can also result in organ-
izational misbehavior including accounting fraud or stock 
1 Whenever we use the term “earnings management,” we refer to 
both ABEM as well as real activities management (RAM).
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price manipulation (Amernic and Craig 2010; Anderson 
and Tirrell 2004; Domino et al. 2015; Harrison et al. 2016). 
Supporting this view Marquez-Illescas et al. (2018) find that 
qualitative disclosures in firms with narcissistic leaders are 
biased upward. Building on the proposition that accounting 
choices are related to narcissism, in this study we provide 
empirical evidence that ABEM is associated with a CEO’s 
decision-making and inherently with the corresponding 
strength of their narcissism.
According to approach-avoidance motivation theory, 
narcissists approach desirable outcomes and are less moti-
vated to avoid negative consequences than less narcissistic 
individuals (Foster et al. 2009; Foster and Trimm 2008). 
Although narcissists perceive risks in the same manner as 
less narcissistic individuals, they take more risks in anticipa-
tion of higher rewards (Foster et al. 2009b). These include 
their pursuit of a grandiose status, which can be accom-
plished by enhancing the company’s financial status, since 
this is an indicator of the CEO’s entrepreneurial ability and 
potentially leads to admiration by stakeholders. Hence, 
narcissistic CEOs are—in the same manner as less narcis-
sistic CEOs—aware of the risks arising from engaging in 
earnings management, such as damage to their reputation 
or the potential for being blamed if a company’s accounting 
choices are denounced (Foster and Trimm 2008). Accord-
ingly, by their very character narcissistic CEOs are weakly 
motivated to avoid these undesirable outcomes. They are 
hence more likely to be influenced by social praise than by 
rational aspects—given an exaggerated level of narcissism—
as they are far more motivated to beat their ambiguous tar-
gets than to minimize potential threats. Supported by the 
empirical evidence that greater CEO narcissism coincides 
with a higher likelihood of committing fraud (Rijsenbilt and 
Commandeur 2013) or releasing financial misstatements 
(Schrand and Zechman 2012; McManus 2016), we hypoth-
esize that higher levels of ABEM are more related to highly 
narcissistic CEOs than less narcissistic CEOs.
H1 ABEM is more frequently associated with highly narcis-
sistic CEOs than with their less narcissistic peers.
In the following two hypotheses, the general association 
with ABEM is further analyzed by differentiating between 
income-increasing and -decreasing ABEM. By doing this we 
aim to divide highly narcissistic CEOs’ motivation to man-
age earnings in two parts, one reflecting a sub-conscious and 
one reflecting a deliberate bias. The understanding of ”delib-
erate” as used in this study corresponds to the way it is pro-
posed by Brennan and Conroy (2013). In particular, Brennan 
and Conroy (2013) considers management decisions to be 
deliberate when they arise “from opportunistic managerial 
behavior with the objective of manipulating organizational 
audiences’ perceptions of the firm” (p. 174). By contrast, a 
sub-conscious cognitive bias results from self-deception or 
egocentric bias. This means that highly narcissistic CEOs 
use ABEM sub-consciously by inflating current performance 
to present the company’s financials and inherently their own 
track record in an overly positive light (Amernic and Craig 
2010). In doing so, they protect themselves from failure or 
shame and satisfy their constant need for self-affirmation 
(Zeigler-Hill and Jordan 2011; Wallace 2011). In line with 
the empirical findings of a positive relationship between 
narcissism and earnings management (Capalbo et al. 2017; 
Olsen et al. 2014), we hypothesize that highly narcissistic 
CEOs employ more sub-conscious usage of ABEM than less 
narcissistic CEOs.
H2 Income-increasing ABEM is more frequently associated 
with highly narcissistic CEOs than with their less narcis-
sistic peers.
While income-increasing ABEM serves the need for 
favorable-looking accounting numbers in the current period 
and therefore reflects a sub-conscious decision, income-
decreasing ABEM allows CEOs to polish earnings in future 
periods. This action can be seen as a deliberate decision in 
line with the aforementioned understanding. First, the deci-
sion of income-decreasing ABEM creates the potential for 
earnings recoveries in future periods. And second, creating 
reserves enables the firm to withstand potential future earn-
ings shocks. Accordingly, we argue that highly narcissistic 
CEOs do not solely strive to optimize their track record in 
the short run by income-increasing ABEM, but are also are 
aware of the long-term effects of their accounting choices. 
It is well known in accounting literature that accruals are a 
function of the difference between reported earnings and 
real cash flows, and that both items have to converge over 
time (Baber et al. 2011; DeFond and Park 2001; Chan et al. 
2004).
Highly narcissistic CEOs’ motivation for income-
decreasing ABEM can be threefold. First, excessive income-
decreasing ABEM will lead to higher reported earnings in 
subsequent periods and vice versa (Jones 1991; Dechow 
et al. 2012). For instance, overstating the allowance for bad 
debt will lower current earnings and discretionary accru-
als, so the measurement and reversal of accruals is at the 
CEO’s discretion, reflecting their superiority and power. 
Furthermore, establishing large reserves with a probabil-
ity of subsequent reversal helps highly narcissistic CEOs to 
protect themselves from failure or shame such as in the case 
of future poor accounting numbers. Second, CEO narcis-
sism is positively related to strategic dynamism and results 
in fluctuating organizational performance (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick 2007). However, higher firm valuation is linked to 
earnings predictability, which is a function of analysts’ abil-
ity to predict future earnings (Schipper and Vincent 2003). 
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As a result, income-decreasing ABEM allows highly nar-
cissistic CEOs to smooth their earnings in order to present 
financial figures more conservatively than they actually are 
which results in higher firm valuation (Bao and Bao 2004). 
Third, it has been empirically shown that CEOs make use 
of income-decreasing ABEM for future earnings recover-
ies or to establish a lower base for future compensation 
plans when, for example, they take the helm of the com-
pany (Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Pourciau 1993). Thus, 
income-decreasing ABEM in the first year allows to save 
earnings for future periods in order to be able to manage 
earnings when needed without being held responsible for 
future financials. In a nutshell, income-decreasing ABEM 
helps top management (CEO) to manipulate organizational 
audiences’ perceptions of the firm and therefore reflects an 
opportunistic decision. We hence hypothesize that highly 
narcissistic CEOs employ more deliberate usage of ABEM 
than less narcissistic CEOs.
H3 Income-decreasing ABEM is more frequently associated 
with highly narcissistic CEOs than with their less narcis-
sistic peers.
Data and Methods
CEO Narcissism Score
Measuring personality is challenging since it is not as easy 
to observe as an individual’s financial position, socio-
economic background, education, or age. Instead of self-
reported measurements, the use of archival data offers the 
major advantage in that data can be compiled independently 
of the CEO’s available time and willingness to cooperate. 
To capture the narcissism trait, we build on the CEO Narcis-
sism Score (CNS) proposed by Rijsenbilt (2011). There are 
several reasons why we choose this model over others that 
employ just one indicator such as first-person pronoun usage 
(Aktas et al. 2016), signature size (Ham et al. 2017), or rat-
ings of video samples of CEOs (Petrenko et al. 2016). Clos-
est to our study is the measurement proposed by Chatterjee 
and Hambrick (2007) with a set of five indicators, which we 
explain in more detail later in this section. Some studies have 
adjusted this model and use a set of three (Olsen et al. 2014) 
or four indicators (Oesterle et al. 2016; Gerstner et al. 2013; 
Engelen et al. 2016). To the best of our knowledge, then, the 
defined model in this study uses the largest set of indicators 
to measure CEO narcissism and simultaneously mitigates 
a potential bias due to a single indicator’s weak ability to 
illustrate a specific trait. Furthermore, the CNS reflects 
the four core dimensions of narcissism: leadership/author-
ity, superiority/arrogance, self-absorption/self-admiration, 
and exploitativeness/entitlement, which are theoretically 
grounded in the work of Emmons (1987). Finally, the CNS 
has been empirically demonstrated to reveal a relationship 
between narcissism and financial reporting. Specifically, 
Rijsenbilt and Commandeur (2013) identify a narcissistic 
CEO’s higher propensity to engage in fraud.
The CNS consists of fifteen indicators reflecting five 
determinants. These are (1) media exposure, (2) perquisites, 
(3) compensation, (4) power, and (5) growth. The wide range 
of determinants is chosen to adequately reflect the distinc-
tive pattern of a CEO’s narcissistic trait since it affects their 
idiosyncratic actions.
First, excessive media exposure helps narcissistic CEOs 
to gain public acknowledgement and reinforcement. The 
exposure indicators are number of awards and number of 
lines in their biography as listed in the Marquis Who’s Who 
database. The number of publications in major news outlets 
is taken from Dow Jones Factiva and reflects the number of 
joint CEO/firm mentions. In addition, the size of the CEO’s 
photograph and its placement in the annual report are meas-
ured on a twelve-point scale. The score is one if there is no 
photograph of the CEO in the annual report and twelve if the 
CEO is pictured alone on a full page plus on an additional 
photograph elsewhere in the report. Where there is no annual 
report, the score is zero.
The second determinant, perquisites, consists of the per-
sonal use of the corporate jet since this reflects a CEO’s sta-
tus and grandeur. The value of private jet use, expressed in 
U.S. dollars, is taken from Form DEF 14A, which is down-
loadable via the U.S. Security Exchange Commission’s Elec-
tronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) 
system. When no disclosure is available, the value is zero.
The third determinant, compensation, contains five vari-
ables indicating a CEO’s self-importance. Cash and total 
compensation data are taken from Compustat’s ExecuComp 
database and consist of the CEO’s salary and bonus as the 
cash component, plus all other forms of dollar-denominated 
compensation to determine the total package. The com-
pensation structure within a firm can be interpreted as an 
appraisal system in which a larger compensation package 
expresses higher hierarchical status and prestige. Since the 
potential of a CEO to influence the compensation structure 
is high, relative cash and total compensation is also calcu-
lated. Relative compensation is derived from the ratio of the 
CEO’s compensation to that of the second-best paid execu-
tive. Finally, the CEO’s rank is measured as the ordinal rank, 
with the highest compensation ranked one, and higher ranks 
expressing less narcissism.
Fourth, narcissistic CEOs strive for attention and over-
estimate their own abilities. To cope with their personal-
ity traits, they centralize decision-making power, which is 
reflected in CEO duality, a higher number of role titles, and 
weaker CG. The variable for CEO duality takes the value 
of one if a CEO is also the Chairman of the Board. The 
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number of role titles ranges from one to five and includes 
CEO, Chairman, Founder, President, Director, or Principal 
Executive. The data for the two variables are taken from 
Compustat’s ExecuComp database. The originally applied 
Gompers Index—a proxy for shareholder rights—is limited 
since it is only available up to 2006, so we replace it by 
Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) entrenchment index measuring six 
actions that limit shareholder rights: staggered boards, limits 
to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden para-
chutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter 
amendments. These six actions are seen as the most relevant 
from the originally applied Gompers Index (Bebchuk et al. 
2009) and they are available throughout our sample period 
from 1992 to 2012. For 2007 onwards, the variable refer-
ring to the supermajority requirement for mergers takes the 
value of one if a majority of more than 50% is required. This 
results in a final score ranging from zero to six, reflecting the 
number of provisions a firm has invoked.
Fifth, to corroborate their superiority, narcissistic CEOs 
tend to acquire other companies. To account for this behav-
ior, the number and value of acquisitions are taken from the 
Thomson One Banker SDC database. An acquisition is taken 
into account if the acquiring firm purchases more than 50% 
of the target shares and the deal value is at least US$10 mil-
lion. The value is scaled by the market value of the acquirer. 
Both variables are cumulated and divided by the years of 
overall tenure and set to zero if no data for acquisitions are 
available.
An overview of the indicators, including the data source 
and description, is given in Table 1. All companies in the 
S&P500 index are included for which data from the various 
databases for the period 1992 to 2012 is available. To ensure 
CEOs can unfold their narcissistic trait in full, a minimum 
tenure of 3 years is required. This requirement is chosen 
with respect to the CEO life cycle (Hambrick and Fukutomi 
1991). A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) of these fif-
teen variables is performed based on the correlation matrix. 
PCA is a data reduction method used to re-express multivari-
ate data with fewer dimensions. The goal is to re-orient the 
data so that the multitude of original variables can be sum-
marized in just a few components that capture the maximum 
possible information from the original variables. In line with 
Rijsenbilt (2011) and to ensure comparable results, we use 
four components. Accordingly, the five aforementioned 
determinants result in four factors representing leadership/
authority, superiority/arrogance, self-absorption/self-admi-
ration, and exploitativeness/entitlement. The factor loadings 
matrix is rotated in order to keep only a few factor loadings 
large. This simplifies the structure and allows us to easily 
interpret factors as clusters of variables that are highly cor-
related with a particular factor. The oblique rotation method 
is chosen since factors are not expected to be uncorrelated.
Table 1  Components of the CEO narcissism score
Table 1 provides an overview of the 15 indicators, reflecting the applied narcissism score. A principal components analysis on these 15 variables 
is performed to reduce the 15 dimensions to four uncorrelated ones. The factor loadings matrix is rotated
Variable Source Description
Publicity Dow Jones Factiva Number of publications divided by the number of tenure years
Awards Marquis Who’s Who Number of awards
Lines in biography Marquis Who’s Who Number of lines in biography
Photograph Annual report Size of CEO’s photograph in annual report
Cash compensation Compustat’s ExecuComp Salary and bonus for every fiscal year
Total compensation Compustat’s ExecuComp Cash plus all other forms of compensation for every fiscal year
Ratio of cash compensation Compustat’s ExecuComp CEO’s cash compensation compared to second-best paid executive
Ratio of total compensation Compustat’s ExecuComp CEO’s total compensation compared to second-best paid executive
Compensation rank Compustat’s ExecuComp Executive rank by salary and bonus
Corporate jet use EDGAR—Form DEF 14A Amount in $ of personal use of corporate aircraft
CEO duality Compustat’s ExecuComp CEO is also chairman
Role titles Compustat’s ExecuComp Number of titles (CEO | President | COO | Chairman | Director | Principal 
Executive | Founder)
Shareholder rights Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) entrenchment index (E index) based on six 
provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, 
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for 
mergers as well as charter amendments
Value of acquisitions Thomson One Banker (SDC) Amount in $ per CEO tenure year
Number of acquisitions Thomson One Banker (SDC) Number per CEO tenure year
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Although our model to measure narcissism has already 
been applied in prior research, so far it has not been vali-
dated in a different context. Rijsenbilt (2011) provides only 
weak evidence of construct validity by comparing the CNS 
of five highly narcissistic CEOs in her sample with the nar-
cissistic CEOs identified by Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006). 
To further validate the CNS, we reconstruct the CEO narcis-
sism score by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), which has 
been externally validated and widely accepted in research. 
They use a set of five indicators to reflect the narcissistic 
construct using archival data: first, the size of the CEO’s 
photograph in the company’s annual report; second, the fre-
quency of a CEO mention in the company’s press releases; 
third, the CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns in 
interviews; fourth and fifth, the CEO’s ratio of cash and non-
cash compensation to that of the second-highest-paid execu-
tive in the firm. We do this for a subsample of 436 CEOs 
and subsequently rate CEO narcissism for this subsample 
using the approach established by Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007). We find that our CNS is significantly correlated with 
the narcissism measure defined by Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007), with a correlation coefficient of 0.53 (p < 0.001). 
These results are assurance that our scoring approach pro-
vides a reasonable measure of CEO narcissism.
Earnings Management
To measure the effect of the association between CEO nar-
cissism and ABEM, we build on the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998). We rely 
on a cross-sectional model in order to avoid the data loss 
inherent in a time-series approach. In addition, the model 
is adjusted for performance as proposed by Kothari et al. 
(2005) by including return on assets in the prior year as an 
additional regressor in model (1), since extreme past per-
formance has a mechanical relationship with accrual esti-
mates. The following model is estimated based on the two-
digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) when there are 
20 or more companies available per industry and year. To 
increase the model fit, discretionary accruals are identified 
as the error term from regressions, based on the one-digit 
SIC when fewer than 20 companies per industry and year are 
allocable (Lee and Masulis 2011):
where  TAit are the total accruals for firm i in year t, and 
measured as the change in working capital, excluding the 
current portion of long-term debt minus depreciation and 
amortization. In addition, ΔREVit is the change in revenues 
for firm i in year t, ΔRECit is the change in receivables for 
firm i in year t,  PPEit is PPE for firm i in year t, and  IBXIit 
is income before extraordinary items for firm i in year t. 
(1)
TA
it
= 훼0 + 훼1
(
ΔREV
it
− ΔREC
it
)
+ 훼2PPEit + a3IBXIit−1 + 휀it,
All variables—including the intercept term in Eq. (1)—are 
scaled by lagged total assets. Discretionary accruals are 
first estimated for all available company years in Compus-
tat (149,373 observations) for the period 1992 to 2012 and 
merged afterwards with existing data on the CNS. This step 
enhances the reliability of inferences drawn from discretion-
ary accruals estimates.
The model proposed by DeFond and Subramanyam 
(1998) refers to the change in balance sheet items to cal-
culate accruals and is hence allocated to the balance sheet 
approach. This approach can be weakened by non-operating 
events such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and exhib-
its discretionary accruals, although these are not caused by 
management’s pure discretion. Specifically, acquisitions 
lead to changes in balance sheet items but do not affect the 
income statement which finally causes immoderate accruals 
(Hribar and Collins 2002). By contrast, the model proposed 
by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and amended by McNichols 
(2002) refers directly to items in the operating section of the 
statement of cash flows. Thus, this model is not affected by 
non-operating changes in balance sheet items and is accord-
ingly allocated to the cash flow approach. Again, the follow-
ing model is estimated based on the two-digit SIC. When 
there are fewer than 20 companies available per industry 
and year, we estimate Eq. (2) based on the one-digit SIC:
where ΔWCit is the change in working capital accruals for 
firm i in year t, measured as the sum of changes in accounts 
receivable (recch), the change in inventory (invch), the 
change in accounts payable (apalch), the change in taxes 
payable (txach), and change in other assets (aoloch). In addi-
tion, ΔWCit is multiplied by minus one, and CFO is cash 
from operations (oancf). All variables—except the intercept 
term in Eq. (2)—are scaled by average total assets. Unlike 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), we do not rely on the standard 
deviation of these residuals as a measure of ABEM. We 
employ signed accruals to distinguish between increasing 
and decreasing ABEM. The proxies for working capital 
accruals are estimated for all available company years in 
the period 1992 to 2012, resulting in 127,966 observations.
To control for the finding that managers opt for one of 
the two earnings management choices—namely ABEM or 
RAM—according to their personal preferences (Zang 2012), 
we additionally calculate three proxies for RAM, namely 
abnormal cash flows from operations (AB_CFO), abnormal 
production costs (AB_PROD), and abnormal discretion-
ary expenses (AB_EXP). Given management’s intention 
to increase reported earnings by granting discounts, total 
sales increase but cash inflow per sale decreases, leading to 
(2)
ΔWC
it
= 훼0 + 훼1CFOit−1 + 훼2CFOit
+ a3CFOit+1 + 훼4ΔREVit
+ 훼5PPEit + 휀it,
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lower AB_CFO. AB_PROD will instead increase if man-
agement decides to capitalize rather than expend per-unit 
fixed costs by raising production levels. Finally, management 
may postpone period costs such as advertisement, research 
and development, or selling, general and administrative 
expenses, leading to decreasing AB_EXP for a given year 
(Cohen et al. 2008; Roychowdhury 2006). To generate the 
combined impact of RAM (COM_RAM), we multiply AB_
CFO and AB_EXP by minus one. Thus, all proxies increase 
with higher levels of RAM. Accordingly, COM_RAM is 
defined as AB_CFO plus AB_PROD plus AB_EXP. Again, 
the proxies for RAM are estimated for all available company 
years, resulting in 146,185 observations for COM_RAM.
Control Variables
Several variables are included to control for effects other 
than that of our variable of interest—the CNS or more spe-
cifically, its extreme decile—on accruals. At first, tenure, 
age, and gender are included, since according to upper ech-
elons theory these may also affect personal behavior. It is 
found that long-tenured CEOs tend to refrain from making 
severe changes, which is known as the “stale in the sad-
dle” paradigm (Miller 1991). Supporting this paradigm, 
Barker and Mueller (2002) find that CEO tenure is nega-
tively associated with a firm’s research and development 
(R&D) expenses. These researchers also find that CEO age 
negatively correlates with R&D expenses, indicating a lower 
willingness among long-tenured and older CEOs to take 
risks. In addition, it is found that older CEOs make more 
diversifying acquisitions, manage firms with more diver-
sified operations, and maintain lower operating leverage 
(Serfling 2014). It is reported that female board members 
are more risk-averse and act more conservatively than their 
male counterparts, resulting in the (attempted) avoidance of 
earnings management (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Ho et al. 
2015). Furthermore, Ingersoll et al. (2017) find that female 
CEOs are less likely to exhibit a narcissistic trait than their 
male counterparts.
Since Petrenko et al. (2016) find that CEO narcissism 
has positive effects on levels and profile of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), we consider a measure of CSR. We 
further propose that CSR is associated with earnings man-
agement in two ways. On the one hand, it restricts manage-
rial ability to manage earnings; on the other, it can also be 
used to satisfy different stakeholder groups in order to obtain 
more managerial discretion (Martínez-Ferrero and García-
Sánchez 2015; Kim et al. 2012). To operationalize CSR, we 
include the standardized value of the sum of total strengths 
minus total concerns for the sub-dimensions community, 
diversity, employees, environment, and product, as taken 
from MSCI ESG STATS, formerly known as the Kinder, 
Lynderberg, and Domini database. Thus, higher levels of the 
proxy variable indicate higher levels of CSR.
To complement CSR, we include an aggregated CG 
measure since Cornett et al. (2008) find that effective CG 
reduces management’s discretion to manage earnings. The 
aggregated CG measure is derived from the CG dimension 
taken from MSCI ESG STATS. The CG measure refers to 
a firm’s sustainability reporting quality, its support for pub-
lic policies, its business ethics, governance practices, and 
executive compensation. The final element is of particular 
importance for this study since prior literature states that 
performance-based compensation is a vital incentive for 
CEOs to manage earnings, which may also lead to misre-
porting and increased litigation risk (Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Holthausen et al. 1995; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). 
We measure CG as the difference between the strengths and 
concerns in the CG dimension of the MSCI ESG STATS 
database. Again, higher levels of the proxy variable indicate 
higher levels of overall CG.
Since executive compensation captures a predominant 
value of the CNS, our results may be driven by exaggerated 
compensation. Therefore, considering the CG measure helps 
to control for a possible mechanical relationship between the 
CNS construction and discretionary accruals. A mechani-
cal relationship may also be established by considering the 
number and value of acquisitions in the CNS. Hribar and 
Collins (2002) argue that discretionary accruals measured 
by a model relying on the balance sheet approach correlate 
with M&A transactions in a given year. Thus, a higher num-
ber and value of acquisitions result in a higher CNS—all 
else being equal—and, accordingly, in higher discretionary 
accruals. To control our results concerning this mechani-
cal relationship—beside the additional model to measure 
accruals with the cash flow approach—we include a binary 
variable which takes the value of one if an M&A transac-
tion is indicated in Compustat’s revenue footnote one for a 
given year.
The natural logarithm of market capitalization and mar-
ket-to-book ratio are also included as proxies for firm size 
and growth opportunity (Roychowdhury 2006). Leverage 
is included because it has been established that companies 
manage earnings to avoid debt covenant violations (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo 1994). Empirical evidence suggests that com-
panies report lower levels of discretionary accruals if they 
are audited by one of the big auditing firms (Becker et al. 
1998; Francis et al. 1999). Therefore, a binary variable is 
included which takes the value of one if the company is 
audited by one of the big auditors. Companies planning a 
seasoned equity offering (SEO) in the near future strive to 
present their financial status in the best light possible (Ran-
gan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998). Therefore, a binary variable is 
included which takes the value of one if the company issues 
equity in the following year. A company’s age is measured 
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by the first entry of the time series in the Center for Research 
and Security Prices to control for different development 
stages of the firm.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1% level, except in the case of the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals, which is only winsorized at the 
top 1% level, respectively. An overview of the dependent 
and independent variables is provided in Table 2.
To mitigate concerns of an omitted variable bias, 
we control for the influence of CEO optimism (Camp-
bell et al. 2004b; Schrand and Zechman 2012), insider 
and blockholder ownership (Cheng and Warfield 2005; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1986), poor financial status (Altman 
1968), a firm’s headquarters location (Leuz et al. 2003), 
business and operating risk as well as a crisis dummy in 
additional specifications. In summary, all results remain 
the same and are available upon request.
Empirical Models
To capture the relationship between ABEM and behav-
iorally driven accounting choices, we set the following 
Table 2  Variable description
Table 2 provides an overview of all dependent and independent variables besides the CNS. All continuous variables in Panel B are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles excluding the absolute value of discretionary accruals, which is winsorized at the 99th percentile only
Variable Source Description
Discretionary accruals (DA) Compustat Discretionary accruals (cross-sectional modified Jones model 
adjusted for performance)
Working capital accruals (WCA) Compustat Working capital accruals are calculated based on the model pro-
posed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols 
(2002)
Abnormal cash flow from operations (AB_CFO) Compustat AB_CFO is defined as the residual from normal CFO as a linear 
function of sales and change in sales. The variable is multiplied 
by minus one so that a positive coefficient indicates increasing 
earnings management
Abnormal production costs (AB_PROD) Compustat AB_PROD is defined as the residual from cost of goods sold and 
change in inventory as a linear function of contemporaneous 
sales
Abnormal discretionary expenses (AB_EXP) Compustat AB_EXP is defined as the residual from discretionary expenses as 
a function of lagged sales. The variable is multiplied by minus 
one so that a positive coefficient indicates increasing earnings 
management
Real activities management (COM_RAM) Compustat AB_CFO + AB_PROD + AB_EXP
CEO tenure Compustat’s ExecuComp Logarithm of full tenure in years
CEO age Compustat’s ExecuComp Age in years
CEO gender Compustat’s ExecuComp A binary variable taking the value of one if the CEO is female
CSR Z-score MSCI ESG STATS Standardized value of the sum of total strengths minus total con-
cerns for the sub-dimensions: community, diversity, employees, 
environment, product
Corporate governance score MSCI ESG STATS Total strengths minus total concerns for the sub dimension: corpo-
rate governance
Acquisition Compustat A binary variable which takes the value of one if an M&A transac-
tion is indicated in Compustat’s revenue footnote one
Size Compustat Logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size
Market-to-book ratio Compustat Market value divided by book value of equity
Leverage Compustat Debt-to-assets ratio as a proxy for leverage
BIG auditing firm Compustat A binary variable taking the value of one if the company is audited 
by a Big auditor
Seasoned equity offering Thomson One Banker A binary variable taking the value of one if the company issues 
equity in the following year
Firm age CRSP One plus the natural logarithm of years since the company is listed 
in the CRSP database
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specifications: first absolute, second positive, and third 
negative discretionary accruals are regressed on CEO nar-
cissism while controlling for RAM, various CEO-specific 
controls, as well as firm, time, and sector controls. To test 
our hypotheses, we also include a binary variable as our 
main variable of interest reflecting the effect of extreme 
narcissism occurrence.
The narcissistic personality disorder affects around 6% of 
the entire U.S. population, rising to nearly 8% among men 
(Stinson et al. 2008). Self-confidence and self-esteem are seen 
as essential characteristics for being appointed to a CEO posi-
tion. However, a narcissist’s exaggerated sense of self-worth 
may often be misinterpreted as self-confidence and inherently 
helps a narcissistic individual to be selected as CEO (O’Reilly 
et al. 2014). Accordingly, we expect CEOs to be more narcis-
sistic than the general population and thus set the threshold 
at 10% to indicate if a CEO is highly narcissistic. The higher 
threshold is also justified since almost all CEOs in the sample 
are male. Therefore, the coefficient 훼2 is a binary variable, 
which takes the value of one if a CEO is in the top decile. 
While the regressions in Table 6 are based on the balance 
sheet approach, we refer to the cash flow approach in Table 7. 
Thus, our model to measure the impact of CEO narcissism on 
ABEM is specified as follows:   
The model is re-estimated using fixed effects regression so 
as to avoid misleading inferences resulting from a potential 
correlation between the unobservable component of the error 
term and the CNS. It also mitigates the potential criticism 
that accounting choices are influenced by many actors such 
as accountants, board members, or auditors who are involved 
in a company’s financial reporting. The estimation using fixed 
effects has to be run at the cost of losing variables with a stable 
mean, like gender or tenure, since they drop out. We also skip 
the variables representing CEO and firm age, since an obser-
vation of a 52-year-old CEO with a mean age of 55 results in 
the same value as a 62-year-old CEO with a mean age of 65. 
In both cases, the variable would reflect a relative difference 
of 3 years, whereas in fact there is an absolute difference of 
10 years between these observations. Accordingly, the model 
controlling for potential firm-specific and unobservable het-
erogeneity is specified as follows:
In additional regressions, the CEO’s first year of tenure is 
excluded to control for a potential bias resulting from anoma-
lies surrounding CEO takeovers and successions (Hazarika 
(3)
EMmeasureit = 훼0 + 훼1Narcissismit + 훼2Narcissism (TopDecile)it
+ 훼3COMRAMit + 훼4Controlsit + 훼5Timet
+ 훼6Industryit + 휀it.
(4)
EMmeasure
it
= 훼0 + 훼1Narcissismit + 훼2Narcissism(TopDecile)it
+ 훼3COMRAM
it
+ 훼4Controlsit + 훼5Timet
+ 훼6Industryit + 휂i + 휀it.
et al. 2012; Wilson and Wang 2010). The untabulated results 
display the same pattern and thus can be seen as robust to this 
aspect.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for the full sample are displayed 
in Table 3. The CNS shows a mean of zero and a stand-
ard deviation of 2.71, while the minimum (maximum) is 
− 10.44 (19.30). Absolute discretionary accruals in this 
study have a mean value of 0.15. As the mean (median) 
for total assets of all sample companies is $34,020 ($8037) 
million, the absolute value of discretionary accruals for 
an average sample company is $5103 ($1206) million 
($34,020 × 0.15 or $8037 × 0.15). Positive (negative) 
accruals exhibit a mean value of 0.17 (− 0.11). Mean ten-
ure is almost 7 years (exp. [1.93]), a CEO is on average 
56 years old, and 2% of CEOs are female.
Table 4 reports the mean and median for the control 
sample (decile 1 to 9) as well as the 10th decile of the 
CNS. The mean and median for the absolute value and 
positive (negative) accruals are all significantly higher 
(lower) for the 10th decile compared to the control sam-
ple. The mean absolute value of discretionary accruals for 
highly narcissistic CEOs is 0.21 and significantly differ-
ent (p < 0.01) from the control group, for which the mean 
value of accruals is 0.15. The increase by six percent-
age points or 40% indicates that highly narcissistic CEOs 
are substantially more associated with ABEM than their 
less narcissistic peers. Given the mean (median) for total 
assets of all sample companies, discretionary accruals 
increase from $5103 ($1206) million ($34020 × 0.15 or 
$8037 × 0.15) to $7144 ($1688) million ($34,020 × 0.21 
or $8037 × 0.21). Despite the statistical significance, we 
also consider the difference of $2041 ($482) million for an 
average sample company to be economically large. In light 
of possible concerns regarding the choice of the control 
group, we rerun the analysis and compare the mean and 
median of the 1st (lowest CNS) and 10th decile (highest 
CNS). The results of the univariate analysis are robust to 
this aspect. The mean and median tenure as well as the age 
of highly narcissistic CEOs are slightly—but statistically 
significantly—higher. The proportion of women does not 
significantly differ between the two groups.
The correlation matrix is reported in Table 5, showing 
that the CNS, as well as its extreme decile, correspond posi-
tively (negatively) with absolute and positive (negative) dis-
cretionary accruals. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) of 
all independent variables are below four. Thus, we do not 
see any multicollinearity issues.
 F. Buchholz et al.
1 3
Relationship Between CEO Narcissism 
and Accrual‑Based Earnings Management
Models 1 to 4 report the coefficients of OLS regressions, 
whereas Models 5 to 8 in Table 6 control for CEO fixed 
effects resulting from time-invariant unobservable hetero-
geneity. The dependent variable is measured as discretion-
ary accruals based on the model proposed by DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998) using the balance sheet approach. At 
first, the association between the absolute value of discre-
tionary accruals and the CNS—without a separation of any 
decile—is measured in Model 1. The insignificant coeffi-
cient supports previous findings which show no relationship 
between CEO narcissism and ABEM (Olsen et al. 2014). 
The CNS coefficient in Model 5—when controlling for CEO 
fixed effects—also displays no significant relationship. By 
contrast, the coefficient for the CNS in its extreme decile is 
significantly positive (p < 0.01) in Model 2, indicating that 
absolute discretionary accruals increase by 5.60 percentage 
points when a highly narcissistic CEO is at the helm of the 
business. This result supports the findings of the univari-
ate analysis, Hypothesis 1, and contradicts previous find-
ings. The difference results from the observance of the 10th 
decile in comparison to the less narcissistic deciles. When 
controlling for CEO fixed effects in Model 6, the positive 
relationship between absolute discretionary accruals and the 
extreme decile remains. This indicates that ABEM is asso-
ciated with highly narcissistic CEOs regardless of whether 
their behavior is affected by unobservable heterogeneity or 
not.
In the following, discretionary accruals are separated 
into positive and negative outcomes to gain a deeper insight 
into whether income-increasing or -decreasing ABEM is 
associated with highly narcissistic CEOs. Models 3 and 4 
report that positive (negative) discretionary accruals are sig-
nificantly positive (negative) associated with the CNS in its 
extreme decile (p < 0.05), indicating that earnings-increasing 
and -decreasing management is associated with highly nar-
cissistic CEOs. These findings support Hypotheses 2 and 3 
as well as the notion that highly narcissistic CEOs resort to 
ABEM for sub-conscious and deliberate biases. The rela-
tionship for both directions remains significant in a fixed 
effect regression, as can be seen in Models 7 and 8. To check 
the robustness of our results, we rerun the analysis in Models 
2 to 4 by reducing the control group to CEOs who are in 
the 1st decile of the CNS. We observe that the significant 
association between ABEM and CEO narcissism holds true 
in the case of positive discretionary accruals (p < 0.10). We 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics for the full sample
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of all dependent and independent variables (excluding industry and year dummies)
Variable # of observations Mean SD Min. 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Discretionary accruals (absolute value) 6939 0.15 0.37 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.11 2.64
Discretionary accruals (signed) 6939 0.03 0.34 − 1.01 − 0.04 0.00 0.05 2.23
Discretionary accruals (positive) 3606 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.12 2.23
Discretionary accruals (negative) 3333 − 0.11 0.19 − 1.01 − 0.11 − 0.04 − 0.02 0.00
Working capital accruals (absolute value) 6736 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.14
Working capital accruals (positive) 3175 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.11
Working capital accruals (negative) 3561 − 0.03 0.03 − 0.11 − 0.04 − 0.02 − 0.01 0.00
Real activities management 6939 − 0.06 1.13 − 5.58 − 0.27 0.00 0.24 4.83
CEO narcissism score 6939 0.00 2.71 − 10.44 − 1.81 − 0.13 1.67 19.30
CEO narcissism score (10th decile) 6939 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
CEO tenure (ln) 6939 1.93 0.68 0.69 1.39 1.95 2.40 3.89
CEO age 6939 56.35 6.42 34.00 52.00 57.00 61.00 85.00
CEO gender 6939 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
CSR Z-score 6939 0.49 1.45 − 4.03 − 0.42 0.48 1.38 7.68
Corporate governance score 6939 − 0.47 0.77 − 4.00 − 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
Acquisition 6939 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Size (ln) 6939 9.08 1.20 6.44 8.28 9.02 9.79 12.21
Total assets (in $ million) 6939 34,020 130,000 189 3,255 8,037 21,625 2,400,000
Market-to-book ratio 6939 3.59 3.53 − 3.28 1.69 2.64 4.17 22.25
Leverage 6939 0.60 0.20 0.14 0.46 0.60 0.73 1.02
BIG auditor 6939 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Seasoned equity offerings 6939 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Firm age (ln) 6939 4.33 0.81 1.00 3.89 4.47 4.91 5.45
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explain the loss of significance for the relationship between 
absolute and negative discretionary accruals and the CNS 
by the reduced number of observations. To further mitigate 
concerns regarding the choice of the control group, we also 
run a sensitivity analysis and change the threshold of 10% 
between the variable of interest and the control group. Our 
results remain robust to the inference drawn that highly nar-
cissistic CEOs are associated with income-decreasing earn-
ings management in the range of 3 to 11%.
Absolute and positive (negative) discretionary accruals 
are—except in Model 7—positively (negatively) associated 
with the combined proxy for RAM (p < 0.05). This is in con-
trast to prior findings that indicate that managers opt for one 
of the two earnings management choices according to their 
personal preferences (Zang 2012). In untabulated results, 
only one out of three single measures of RAM, namely AB_
EXP, is significantly positive (p < 0.01) related to ABEM, 
whereas AB_CFO and AB_PROD are significantly negative 
(p < 0.01). Therefore, the unexpected relationship between 
ABEM and RAM can be extensively explained by the posi-
tive relationship between AB_EXP and discretionary accru-
als. Overall, we do not see a consistent pattern which refutes 
existing findings that managers choose between these two 
earnings management techniques. In addition, we do not find 
a consistent pattern between the relationship between CEO 
narcissism and RAM irrespective of separating any decile.
The additional personal variables such as tenure, age, or 
gender do not—or only to a lesser extent—have a significant 
relationship with ABEM. This is in line with the findings of 
Cornett et al. (2008), who report no significant relationship 
between discretionary accruals and CEO characteristics such 
as tenure and age.
Table 7 reports the coefficients of OLS regressions in 
Models 1 to 3, whereas Models 4 to 6 control for CEO 
fixed effects resulting from time-invariant unobservable 
heterogeneity. The dependent variable is measured as 
working capital accruals based on the model proposed 
by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and amended by McNich-
ols (2002) using the cash flow approach. This model is 
applied to control for the effect of non-accurate accru-
als identification in case of non-operating events such 
as M&A. This represents a non-negligible aspect in this 
study since M&A transactions are present in 22% of all 
firm-year observations, as can be seen in Table 3. Never-
theless, the significance remains for all of the coefficients 
reflecting the CNS in its extreme decile compared to the 
coefficients in Table 6. Given the significantly positive 
relationship (p < 0.01) between our variable of inter-
est and the absolute value of discretionary accruals in 
Models 1 and 4, we see further support for Hypothesis 1, 
which states that ABEM is more associated with highly 
narcissistic CEOs than their less narcissistic peers. We 
Table 4  Descriptive statistics by firms with highly narcissistic CEOs versus control firms
Table 4 presents the means and medians for the control sample (deciles 1 to 9) and firms with a highly narcissistic CEO (10th decile). T-statistics 
are from t tests for the difference in means, and z-statistics from Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test for the differences in medians
Variable Control sample 10th decile Difference in
Mean Median Mean Median Means (t value) Median (p value)
Discretionary accruals (absolute value) 0.15 0.04 0.21 0.06 − 3.83 − 5.66
Discretionary accruals (signed) 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 − 0.06 1.66
Discretionary accruals (positive) 0.16 0.04 0.23 0.06 − 2.75 − 4.19
Discretionary accruals (negative) − 0.11 − 0.04 − 0.14 − 0.06 2.98 3.87
Real activities management − 0.05 0.00 − 0.13 0.03 1.72 − 2.10
CEO narcissism score − 0.56 − 0.46 5.05 4.50 − 66.65 − 43.45
CEO narcissism score (10th decile) 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 − 226.10 − 83.14
CEO tenure (ln) 1.92 1.95 1.99 1.95 − 2.69 − 2.55
CEO age 56.30 57.00 56.83 57.00 − 2.08 − 1.98
CEO gender 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.56 0.56
CSR Z-score 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.03 0.17 1.81
Corporate governance score − 0.45 0.00 − 0.69 − 1.00 8.10 8.78
Acquisition 0.21 0.00 0.35 0.00 − 8.73 − 8.68
Size (ln) 9.00 8.96 9.80 9.71 − 17.12 − 14.99
Market-to-book ratio 3.56 2.64 3.79 2.73 − 1.60 − 2.23
Leverage 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.60 − 1.64 − 1.45
BIG auditor 0.91 1.00 0.95 1.00 − 4.17 − 4.16
Seasoned equity offerings 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 − 1.41 − 1.41
Firm age (ln) 4.31 4.47 4.44 4.62 − 3.95 − 5.59
 F. Buchholz et al.
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Table 6  CEO narcissism and accrual-based earnings management (balance sheet approach)
Table 6 displays regression results for models 1 to 4: EMmeasure
it
= 훼0 + 훼1Narcissismit + 훼2Narcissism (Top Decile)it + 훼3COMRAM
it
+ 훼4Controlsit+
훼5Timet + 훼6Industryit + 휀it and for models 5 to 8, respectively: EM_measureit = 훼0 + 훼1Narcissismit + 훼2Narcissism (Top Decile)it+
훼3COMRAM
it
+ 훼4Disc.Accrualsit+훼5Controlsit + 훼6Timet + 훼7Industryit + 휂i + 휀it. Absolute, positive, and negative discretionary accruals (DA) 
are the dependent variables in each model. Accruals are calculated based on the model proposed by DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) and 
adjusted for performance as proposed by Kothari et al. (2005). The variable of interest is a binary variable which takes the value of one if the 
manager is in the 10th decile of the CNS. Models 1 to 3 apply an OLS regression, whereas models 4 to 6 control for the CEO fixed effect of 
time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity resulting from the influence of organizational culture on CEOs’ ability to enforce their accounting 
choices. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are displayed in parentheses and clustered on CEO level. Asterisks indicate significance at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables DA abs. value DA abs. value DA pos. DA neg. DA abs. value DA abs. value DA pos. DA neg.
CEO narcissism score − 0.000577 − 0.00462** − 0.00610** 0.00269* 0.000403 − 0.00488 − 0.00377 0.00380
(0.00186) (0.00208) (0.00284) (0.00160) (0.00324) (0.00325) (0.00598) (0.00269)
CEO narcissism score 
(10th decile)
0.0560*** 0.0619** − 0.0340** 0.0739*** 0.0958** − 0.0444**
(0.0217) (0.0295) (0.0134) (0.0257) (0.0443) (0.0179)
Real activities manage-
ment
0.0179*** 0.0179*** 0.0172** − 0.0158*** 0.0186*** 0.0187*** 0.0175 − 0.0173***
(0.00585) (0.00585) (0.00841) (0.00451) (0.00678) (0.00678) (0.0111) (0.00640)
CEO tenure 0.0189* 0.0181* 0.0235* − 0.00729
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0130) (0.00681)
CEO age − 0.00119 − 0.00117 − 0.000579 0.00105
(0.000962) (0.000962) (0.00123) (0.000674)
CEO gender 0.0321 0.0320 0.0447 0.0147
(0.0426) (0.0428) (0.0542) (0.0276)
CSR Z-scoret−1 0.0110** 0.0114*** 0.0119** − 0.00472 8.79e−05 − 0.000100 0.0166 0.00728
(0.00432) (0.00434) (0.00564) (0.00302) (0.00935) (0.00933) (0.0139) (0.00655)
Corporate governance 
 scoret−1
0.00470 0.00488 0.00313 − 0.00827 0.0111 0.0109 0.0165 − 0.00906
(0.00767) (0.00769) (0.00950) (0.00507) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0138) (0.00846)
Acquisition 0.0237* 0.0228* 0.00585 − 0.0170* 0.0242 0.0237 − 0.00904 − 0.0186
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0158) (0.00970) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0200) (0.0122)
Size (ln)t−1 − 0.00302 − 0.00369 0.00440 0.00567 − 0.00646 − 0.00604 0.000445 0.00294
(0.00589) (0.00591) (0.00735) (0.00398) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0298) (0.0143)
Market-to-book  ratiot−1 − 0.000947 − 0.00108 − 0.00345 − 0.000599 0.000289 3.35e−05 − 0.00435 0.00124
(0.00235) (0.00235) (0.00305) (0.00122) (0.00317) (0.00316) (0.00548) (0.00229)
Leveraget−1 0.000634 0.00537 0.0351 0.0250 0.0364 0.0414 0.231 0.0736
(0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0446) (0.0230) (0.113) (0.113) (0.168) (0.0893)
BIG auditing firm − 0.0397** − 0.0398** − 0.0299 0.0318** 0.00120 0.00280 0.000519 − 0.0202
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0246) (0.0137) (0.0362) (0.0356) (0.0667) (0.0301)
Seasoned equity 
 offeringst+1
− 0.0300* − 0.0284* − 0.0371* 0.00794 − 0.0529** − 0.0507** − 0.0298 0.0266*
(0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0210) (0.0112) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0289) (0.0155)
Firm age (ln) − 0.00479 − 0.00501 − 0.0133 − 0.00515
(0.00833) (0.00832) (0.0107) (0.00496)
Constant 0.0468 0.0175 − 0.00290 − 0.0877* 0.0835 0.0690 − 0.0786 − 0.112
(0.0797) (0.0841) (0.129) (0.0466) (0.166) (0.166) (0.279) (0.139)
Observations 5,813 5,813 3,047 2,766 5,813 5,813 3,047 2,766
R-squared 0.216 0.218 0.282 0.284 0.054 0.056 0.105 0.093
Time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
CEO fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of CEOs 1126 1126 1015 993
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consider the increase of 0.45 percentage points (Model 
1) as economically large, too, given the mean and stand-
ard deviation of 3% for absolute working capital accruals 
(see Table 3). In addition, the coefficients for the CNS in 
its extreme decile are significantly positive (negative) in 
Models 2 and 5 (3 and 6), indicating that income-increas-
ing (-decreasing) ABEM is more associated with highly 
narcissistic CEOs than with their less narcissistic peers. 
Therefore, the results referred from accruals measured by 
a cash flow approach also support Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Accrual‑Based Earnings Management Surrounding 
CEO Turnovers
To further strengthen Hypothesis 3, we apply a difference-
in-difference analysis around CEO turnovers. At this point, 
CEOs have the possibility to decrease earnings and make 
their predecessors responsible for the resulting poor per-
formance while benefiting from higher reported earnings 
in future periods. In addition, a lower base for future com-
pensation plans is also established (Moore 1973; Pourciau 
1993). However, it has to be mentioned that CEOs in gen-
eral are able to exploit earnings management techniques 
around CEO turnovers (Wells 2002; Godfrey et al. 2003). 
Table 7  CEO narcissism and accrual-based earnings management (cash flow approach)
Table  7 displays regression results for models 1 to 3: EMmeasure
it
= 훼0 + 훼1Narcissismit + 훼2Narcissism(Top Decile)it + 훼3COMRAM
it
 
+훼4Controlsit + 훼5Timet + 훼6Industryit + 휀it and for models 4 to 6, respectively: EM_measureit = 훼0 + 훼1Narcissismit+
훼2Narcissism(Top Decile)it + 훼3COMRAM
it
+ 훼4Disc.Accrualsit+ 훼5Controlsit+훼6Timet + 훼7Industryit + 휂i + 휀it . Absolute, positive, and nega-
tive abnormal changes in working capital accruals (WCA) are the dependent variables in each model. Accruals are calculated based on the 
model proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002). The variable of interest is a binary variable which takes the 
value of one if the manager is in the 10th decile of the CNS. Firm-specific control variables include CEO tenure, CEO age, CEO gender, CSR 
Z-score, corporate governance, acquisition, size (ln), market-to-book ratio, leverage, BIG auditing firm, seasoned equity offerings, and firm age 
(ln). Models 1 to 3 apply an OLS regression, whereas models 4 to 6 control for the CEO fixed effect of time-invariant unobservable heteroge-
neity resulting from the influence of organizational culture on CEOs’ ability to enforce their accounting choices. Heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are displayed in parentheses and clustered on CEO level. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) 
levels
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables WCA abs. value WCA pos. WCA neg. WCA abs. value WCA pos. WCA neg.
CEO narcissism score − 0.000350 − 0.000249 0.000363 − 1.15e−05 0.000537 0.000495
(0.000225) (0.000278) (0.000294) (0.000341) (0.000457) (0.000454)
CEO narcissism score (10th decile) 0.00447*** 0.00434** − 0.00419** 0.00526*** 0.00496* − 0.00612**
(0.00161) (0.00210) (0.00207) (0.00178) (0.00289) (0.00250)
Real activities management − 0.000115 − 0.000142 − 7.75e−05 7.12e−05 0.000734 6.81e−05
(0.000370) (0.000482) (0.000470) (0.000380) (0.000557) (0.000523)
CEO tenure 0.000207 − 0.000124 − 0.000429
(0.000851) (0.000962) (0.00101)
CEO age − 3.00e−05 − 1.02e−05 4.18e−05
(8.30e−05) (9.36e−05) (0.000101)
CEO gender 0.00220 − 0.00109 − 0.00459
(0.00424) (0.00427) (0.00562)
Constant 0.0639*** 0.0656*** − 0.0447*** 0.0168 0.0160 − 0.00592
(0.0134) (0.0160) (0.00723) (0.0166) (0.0208) (0.0232)
Observations 5,632 2,656 2,976 5,632 2,656 2,976
R-squared 0.114 0.134 0.128 0.028 0.033 0.045
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
CEO fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of CEOs 1125 1010 1045
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Accordingly, the difference-in-difference analysis allows us 
to isolate the association between highly narcissistic CEOs 
and income-decreasing ABEM while controlling for a 
general effect that occurs around CEO turnovers and succes-
sion. Thus, the model to measure the impact of highly nar-
cissistic CEOs on decreasing ABEM is specified as follows:
Again, a fixed effect regression is estimated to control for 
unobservable heterogeneity:
To examine whether a change from a prior, less nar-
cissistic CEO to a highly narcissistic CEO is associated 
with ABEM, we use negative discretionary accruals as 
our dependent variable. AFTER is a binary variable that is 
equal to one in the year and the subsequent year of the CEO 
change. Running this regression, we only examine firms that 
underwent a CEO change. We include the 2 years before, 
the year of the change, and the year after the CEO change. 
CNS_CHANGE is a binary variable that is equal to one for 
all firms that changed from a weakly to a highly narcissis-
tic CEO. We consider the year in which the CEO change 
occurred plus the two subsequent years for a change from 
low to high CEO narcissism, as it may take some time for 
the narcissistic character traits to take effect and thus be 
captured by our measure of CEO narcissism. A high CNS is 
defined as a CNS score in the 10th decile of the sample. All 
other variables are defined as described above.
The coefficient CEO change * after which reflects the 
relationship between highly narcissistic CEOs and negative 
discretionary accruals around CEO turnovers is significant 
in the fixed effect regression, indicating that CEO fixed 
effects are present. In a nutshell, we interpret our results 
as evidence that highly narcissistic CEOs mainly strive to 
assure their positive self-view and even embrace brazen self-
enhancement strategies, such as making others responsible 
for poor performance (Campbell et al. 2000; Horvath and 
Morf 2010). This result further supports Hypothesis 3.
Robustness
It has been shown that incentives on their own, and corpo-
rate governance features on their own, also affect earnings 
management (Armstrong et al. 2010; Buyl et al. 2017). Thus, 
the question that arises is whether the results are driven by 
(5)
Negative discretionary accruals
it
= 훼0 + 훼1CNS_CHANGEit ∗ AFTERit
+ 훼2CNS_CHANGEit + 훼3AFTERit
+ 훼4COMRAM
it
+ 훼5Controlsit + 훼6Timet
+ 훼7Industryit + 휀it.
(6)
Negative discretionary accruals
it
= 훼0 + 훼1CNS_CHANGEit ∗ AFTERit
+ 훼2CNS_CHANGEit + 훼3AFTERit
+ 훼4COMRAM
it
+ 훼5Controlsit + 훼6Timet
+ 훼7Industryit + 휂i + 휀it.
Table 8  Accrual-based earnings management surrounding CEO turn-
overs
Table  8 displays regression results for model 1: DA neg
it
= 훼0+
훼1CNS_CHANGEit ∗ AFTERit + 훼2CNS_CHANGEit + 훼3AFTERit+
훼4COMRAM
it
+ 훼5Controlsit + 훼6Timet + 훼7Industryit + 휀it and for 
model 2, respectively: DA neg
it
= 훼0 + 훼1CNS_CHANGEit ∗
AFTER
it
+ 훼2CNS_CHANGEit + 훼3AFTERit + 훼4COMRAM
it
+ 훼5Controlsit
+훼6Timet + 훼7Industryit + 휂i + 휀it . Negative discretionary accruals 
(DA) is the dependent variable in each model. The change from a 
weakly to strongly narcissistic CEO and its effect on decreasing earn-
ings management is investigated. The sample is minimized to firms 
showing a CEO turnover. Two years before, the year of change, and 1 
year after the CEO change are investigated. CNS_CHANGE*AFTER 
is the main variable of interest and interacts the variables CNS_
CHANGE and AFTER. CNS_CHANGE is a binary variable that is 
equal to one when a firm changes its CEO from a prior low to a now 
highly narcissistic CEO (10th decile). AFTER is equal to zero 2 years 
before the CEO change and equal to one for the 2 years after the CEO 
change. Firm-specific control variables include CEO tenure, CEO 
age, CEO gender, CSR Z-score, corporate governance, acquisition, 
size (ln), market-to-book ratio, leverage, BIG auditing firm, seasoned 
equity offerings, and firm age (ln). Model 1 applies an OLS regres-
sion, whereas model 2 controls for the CEO fixed effect of time-
invariant unobservable heterogeneity resulting from the influence of 
organizational culture on CEOs’ ability to enforce their accounting 
choices. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are displayed 
in parentheses and clustered on CEO level. Asterisks indicate signifi-
cance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels
Models (1) (2)
Variables DA neg. DA neg.
CEO change * after − 0.0369 − 0.166*
(0.0486) (0.0940)
CEO change 0.00826 0.128
(0.0213) (0.0934)
After − 0.00111 0.0138
(0.0276) (0.0495)
Real activities management − 0.0190** − 0.0233
(0.00887) (0.0186)
CEO tenure 0.00689
(0.0163)
CEO age − 0.00106
(0.00154)
CEO gender 0.00522
(0.0680)
Constant − 0.112 − 1.327***
(0.148) (0.370)
Observations 582 582
R-squared 0.328 0.191
Firm controls Yes Yes
Time controls Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes No
CEO fixed effects No Yes
Number of CEOs 443
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the construct of narcissism—the CNS—as a whole, by its 
principal components, or separate indicators. Therefore, we 
rerun all regressions while separately considering each prin-
cipal component reflecting leadership/authority, superiority/
arrogance, self-absorption/self-admiration, and exploitative-
ness/entitlement. In addition, we control for the existence 
of a mechanical relationship by separately considering each 
indicator reflecting the incentives and CG mechanisms 
which influence earnings management—namely cash and 
total compensation, ratio of cash and total compensation, 
compensation rank, CEO duality, role titles, shareholder 
rights, value of acquisitions, and number of acquisitions. 
We find that none of these principal components or indica-
tors are able to consistently explain the results on their own. 
Accordingly, we conclude that our results are driven by the 
CNS as a whole rather than by its principal components or 
indicators individually.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we examine CEO narcissism and its implica-
tions for accounting choices in S&P 500 companies for the 
period 1992 to 2012. Based on a set of 15 indicators measur-
ing CEO narcissism, we hypothesize that an extreme level 
of narcissism is associated with ABEM. We posit that the 
pursuit of self-enhancement on the part of highly narcissis-
tic CEOs has to be seen as selfish behavior, since it mainly 
serves to help them cope with their trait. In particular, repu-
tational loss will lead to lower firm values and harm share-
holders if opportunistic accounting choices are detected and 
denounced. As discussed by Healy and Wahlen (1999), we 
do not consider discretionary accruals as a proxy for oppor-
tunistic accounting choices or more specifically, earnings 
management per se. It is hardly—maybe not ever—possible 
to distinguish between a manager’s discretion that reflects 
additional information about a firm’s future financial per-
formance and accounting choices that turn into earnings 
manipulation. Although it is a challenging task, there are 
two reasons why we believe that the results reflect self-serv-
ing behavior rather than the intention to provide the market 
with additional information about a firm’s future financial 
performance.
First, the results provide evidence that highly narcissis-
tic CEOs are more associated with ABEM than their less 
narcissistic peers. It has to be noted that the higher level 
of earnings-increasing accruals can be driven by the fact 
that narcissistic individuals are likely to be more optimistic 
(Hickman et al. 1996). Yet we doubt that an increase of 40% 
or $2041 ($482) million in absolute discretionary accruals 
based on mean (median) total assets of an average sample 
company—as illustrated in the descriptive statistics—is 
solely driven by a possible propensity to paint too optimistic 
a picture of future financial performance.
Second, an overstatement of future financial performance 
caused, e.g., by optimism, ought to lead mainly to income-
increasing earnings management. However, the results dis-
close a strong relationship with earnings-increasing as well 
as -decreasing accounting choices. The finding relating to 
earnings-decreasing accounting choices indicates opportun-
istic behavior that is employed to prepare the ground for 
increasing future earnings. Supporting this view, the differ-
ence-in-difference analysis provides evidence that income-
decreasing earnings management is employed at a specific 
point in time—namely the changeover from a weakly to a 
highly narcissistic CEO—which is an opportunity to make 
one’s predecessor responsible for poor performance, or 
to strengthen one’s position in preparation for executive 
compensation negotiations. To sum up, we conclude that 
accounting choices, both income-increasing and -decreasing, 
by highly narcissistic CEOs are rather driven by self-serving 
or opportunistic behavior than the intention to provide the 
market with additional information about a firm’s future 
financial performance. Accordingly, we see a negative asso-
ciation between CEO narcissism and firms’ earnings quality.
Our results have implications for upper echelons theory 
in that they reflect that the CEO’s decision to manage earn-
ings is a function of the manager’s personality trait. At first 
glance, our results of an association between narcissis-
tic CEOs and earnings management supplement the prior 
findings of Olsen et al. (2014) and Capalbo et al. (2017), 
which state that narcissistic CEOs tend to inflate reported 
earnings. Accordingly, an inflation of reported earnings 
supports the proposition that highly narcissistic CEOs are 
limited in their actions by narcissistic myopia (Lakey et al. 
2008; Campbell and Miller 2011). Specifically, narcissis-
tic individuals are found to exhibit short-sighted behav-
ior resulting in negative long-term outcomes (Vazire and 
Funder 2006; Giampetro-Meyer et al. 1998). This focus on 
reward is defined as “narcissistic myopia [which] is a state in 
which any interpersonal skills possessed by the narcissist are 
disabled while concurrently creating heightened desire for 
admiration” (Baumeister and Vohs 2001, p. 208). Accord-
ingly, narcissistic myopia ought to promote the presentation 
of attractive financial numbers and cause increasing earnings 
through accounting choices. At second glance, our results 
add another implication to the common understanding of 
prior findings. Highly narcissistic CEOs’ sense of superior-
ity makes them believe that they will perform well (Gabriel 
et al. 1994; Hickman et al. 1996) and convinces them to 
stay longer in their position. Therefore, they will more likely 
build reserves for the future through earnings management 
to polish their individual track record over their entire ten-
ure. Therefore, narcissistic CEOs are not only affected by 
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narcissistic myopia but also take long-term outcomes into 
account as long as they serve them.
The results of this study also provide insights for CG 
research. It has been argued that corporate codes of conduct 
are negatively affected by narcissism and are thus ineffec-
tive in ensuring a desirable level of ethical behavior inside 
the company (Roberts 2001). Narcissism is one trait that is 
seen to influence companies’ financial or reputational out-
comes negatively (Craig and Amernic 2011; Chen 2010). 
More severely, narcissism within firms is unlikely to be—or 
may not ever be—mitigated by organizational rules or moni-
toring actions (Duchon and Drake 2009; Lubit 2002). This 
corroborates the importance of ex-ante mechanisms, such 
as considering an applicant’s personality when appointing 
a new CEO. It may also be reasonable to select a highly 
narcissistic CEO, especially if a company needs a visionary 
leader to manage organizational change (Maccoby 2004). 
Yet if companies take a sincere, honest, and trustworthy 
approach to enhancing the level of ethics within their cor-
poration, selecting a highly narcissistic CEO can be harmful 
(Conger 1990).
The findings in this study are subject to limitations. Most 
notably, it is not possible to directly observe executives’ 
levels of narcissism and so our archival measure is only 
a proxy of CEO narcissism. As Barnes et al. (2015) note, 
“Researchers should be cautious when considering [archival 
data], carefully evaluating whether the measures included 
in the database can be said to accurately represent a given 
construct” (p. 1466). Specifically, personality is multifac-
torial and the ability to accurately reflecting personality is 
limited when resorting to archival data. For example, the 
lack of direct measurements mitigates the ability to dis-
criminate between related but yet different personality traits 
such as narcissism, hubris, or overconfidence. To overcome 
this issue, Barnes et al. (2015) point out the advantages 
of involving qualitative data such as content analysis into 
archival research. To name a sound example, Brennan and 
Conroy (2013) apply manual content analysis by analyzing 
the narrative content of the CEO letters to shareholders in 
order to reveal insights about the relationship between hubris 
and impression management. Given our reliance on archival 
data, we have made great effort to mitigate the influence of 
other factors that could be at work. For example, we conduct 
a convergent validation with an existing measure of CEO 
narcissism and include variables which proxy for another 
trait such as CEO optimism, or external boundaries such as 
corporate governance mechanisms.
Furthermore, the results may also be driven by a mechani-
cal relationship that we mitigate by controlling for exag-
gerated compensation or the existence of acquisitions. In 
addition, the role of CFO narcissism may also affect results, 
although we control for CEO fixed effects. Measuring CFO 
narcissism using our model with its various indicators is 
subject to a limitation. CFOs are not as much in the pub-
lic eye as CEOs and hence important indicators, such as a 
photograph in the annual report, are missing. In addition, 
we acknowledge that the requirements for the measurement 
of the applied CNS are high and that the results may not be 
fully transferable to other countries.
Finally, we present several potential reasons why highly 
narcissistic CEOs may decrease earnings. Although our 
results provide some evidence of income-decreasing earn-
ings management when highly narcissistic CEOs taking the 
helm of a firm, we see a fruitful path for future research into 
whether specific external factors promote income-decreasing 
ABEM, such as in the case of a crisis inside the firm. For 
example, Haggard et al. (2015) may serve as a good exam-
ple—which is part of the extensive literature surrounding 
“big bath accounting”—to analyze whether highly narcis-
sistic CEOs exploit the accrual reversal effect for private 
purposes.
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